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Taxation
BY KATHRYN L. MOORE*
INTRODUCTION
ertainly the most publicized development in Kentucky tax law
5during the last five years was the series of decisions in St. Ledger
/v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet,' striking down two of Kentucky's
intangibles taxes.2 The St. Ledger decisions, however, were not the only tax
law development to receive attention.
There were a number of legislative developments of some significance.
Specifically, GovernorBrereton Jones formedaTax Policy Commission that
comprehensively reviewed Kentucky's tax structure. Although the 1996
General Assembly did not fully embrace the Commission's recommen-
dations over the last five years, the General Assembly did enact some
significant legislation. For example, the General Assembly enacted legislation
permitting affiliated corporations to choose between filing their income tax
returns on a separate or consolidated basis.4 In addition, it replaced
Kentucky's century-old bank shares tax with a franchise-based tax.5 Finally,
*Assistant Professor of Law, University ofKentucky. A.B. 1983, University of
Michigan; J.D. 1988, Cornell Law School. The author is grateful to Timothy Gillis
and Mark F. Sommer for their comments and to Stacie Turner and Carol Parris for
their research assistance. The author is also grateful to Eileen Black and
Professional Education Systems, Inc. ("PESr') for the use of PESI's seminar
materials in the preparation of this update.
' St. Ledgerv. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 912 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1995), vacated
and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996), on remand, 942 S.W.2d 893 (Ky.), cert.
dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
2 For a brief discussion of the cases, see Part II.A. For a more detailed
discussion of the cases, see Rick Alsip et al., Note, St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue
Cabinet: The Tax That Would Not Die, 86 KY. L.J. 1053 (1997-98), in this issue.
3 See Part I.A.
4 See 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 239 (codified as amended at KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
[hereinafter K.R.S.] § 141.120 (Michie Supp. 1996) (discussed in Part I.B)).
'See 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 254 (codified as amended at K.R.S. §§ 136.500-.575
(Michie Supp. 1996) (discussed in Part I.C)).
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the General Assembly enacted legislation phasing out much ofthe inheritance
tax.
6
On the judicial side, a number of unreported decisions also received a
good deal of attention. For example, in a decision that has yet to become final,
the Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld the constitutionality of the Revenue
Cabinet's interim method of assessing unmined coal for tax years 1989
through 199 1.7 In an unpublished opinion that subsequently was withdrawn,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied a foreign holding company a remedy
for unconstitutional discrimination imposed by a preferential license tax
scheme.8
This Article discusses the legislative and judicial developments described
above. In addition, it discusses a few other developments that may be of
interest to tax practitioners. 9
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Tax Policy Commission
In February 1995, Governor Brereton C. Jones created the Kentucky
Commission on Tax Policy.'0 The Commission, composed of representatives
from private enterprise, the General Assembly, and state government, was
charged with comprehensively reviewing Kentucky's tax structure with a
focus on (1) fairness, (2) simplicity, (3) adequacy, and (4) competitiveness."
On November 15, 1995, the Commission issued its final report recom-
mending a number of significant changes in Kentucky tax law.' 2 For example,
6 1995 Ky. Acts ch. 2 (codified as amended at K.R.S. §§ 136.53, 140.070 &
140,080 (Michie Supp. 1996) (discussed in Part I.D)).
7See Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gillig, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 91 (decision not
final) (discussed in Part ll.B).
8See Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. USX Corp., No. 93-CA-000072-MR and
No. 93-CA-000123-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1994), reprinted in BRUCEF. CLARK ETAL.,
KENTUCKY STATE TAXIssuEs UPDATE 122-30 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 UPDATE]
(discussed in Part II.C).
' This survey is not intended to provide an exhaustive listing of all
developments in Kentucky taxation in the last five years. For more comprehensive
coverage, see TERRY F. CONLEY ET AL., KENTUCKY STATE TAX ISSUES UPDATE
(1997) [hereinafter 1997 UPDATE]; BRUCEF. CLARK ETAL.,KENTUCKY STATE TAX
ISSUES UPDATE (1996) [hereinafter 1996 UPDATE]; 1995 UPDATE, supra note 8.
'oSee Executive Order 94-129 (Feb. 6, 1995).
"See id.
'2 See KENTUCKY COMMISSION ON TAX POLICY, A BLUEPRINT FOR COMPRE-
HENSIVE REFORM (Nov. 15, 1995) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT].
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the Commission proposed eliminating the preference given to Kentucky
domestic corporations under the license tax3 and extending the sales tax to
new services." In addition, the Commission proposed a constitutional
amendment to eliminate all property taxes on tangible and intangible
property. 5
Although the efforts of the Commission were praiseworthy, the 1996
General Assembly followed through on few of the Commission's recommen-
dations. 16 The General Assembly's failure to embrace flly the Commission's
recommendations may be attributed to a number of factors. 7 First, the
Commission was formed by Governor Brereton Jones, who was no longer in
office when the 1996 General Assembly convened. 8 Second, the General
Assembly reformed inheritance19 and pension20 taxation in a 1995 Special
Session, so those critical areas were removed from the Commission's
review.' Finally, in 1996, new taxes were highly objectionable given the
political environment in Kentucky, as throughout most of the nation.'
Because the Commission was charged with revenue neutrality, any reduction
in taxation in one area had to be replaced with an increase in taxation in
another area, and the political climate simply did not support any new taxes.'
Despite the fact that the 1996 General Assembly did not wholly embrace
the Commission's recommendations, the General Assembly did enact some
noteworthy legislative changes over the last five years. Those changes are
discussed below.
B. Consolidated Income Tax Returns- House Bill 59924
Before House Bill 599, there had been extensive litigation and uncer-
tainty regarding the proper method of filing and reporting Kentucky income
3 See id. at 5, 58.
'4 See id. at 7-8, 64-65.
"See id. at 5-6, 58-61.
16 The 1996 General Assembly did not disregard all of the Commission's
recommendations. For example, the Commission recommended that the health care
provider tax, as applied to physicians, be eliminated, see id. at 7, 62-63, and the
1996 General Assembly enacted legislation phasing out the provider tax as applied
to physicians, see infra Part I.F.
" See 1996 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 1-2.
18 See id. at 1.
1 See infra Part I.D.
'0 See infra Part I.I.
21 See BLUEPRINT, supra note 12, at 1.
22 See id.
23Seeid. at 1-2.
24 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 239.
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tax for multi-corporate groups.25 In 1972, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet
began to rely on section 141.120 as authority for the filing of combined
income tax returns for unitary multi-corporate businesses.2 6 Under the unitary
combined reporting method, each member of a "unitary business computes
its individual taxable income by taking a portion of the combined net income
of the group."27 This method of tax accounting is designed to "insure that the
income of a business that is conducted partly within and partly without a
taxing state is determined and apportioned in the same manner regardless of
whether the business is conducted by one corporation or two or more
affiliated corporations." 29
Traditionally,29 a three-unities test was used to determine whether a
multi-corporate group constituted a unitary business.30 Under that test, a
business is unitary if there is "(1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of operation
as evidencedby central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management
divisions; and (3) unity of use of its centralized executive force and general
system ofoperation." 31 The test hadto be applied on ataxpayer-specific basis
5 See 1996 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 11.
26 See G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. 1994).
27 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Department of Revenue, 618 P.2d 1261, 1262-63
(Or. 1980); see also Income Taxes: ConsolidatedReturns and CombinedReporting
Tax Management, MULTISTATE TAX PORTFOLIOS 1130:0002 (1994); Frank M.
Keesling, A Current Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation
Practices, 42 J. TAX'N 106 (1975).28Keesling, supra note 27, at 106.
9In 1995, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinetproposed aregulation, which, among
other things, would have adopted the three criteria of functional integration,
centralization of management, and economies of scale to determine when a
business is unitary. See proposed 103 K.A.R. 16:190(1)(26), in 4 K.A.R. 761 (Oct.
1, 1995). These three criteria were emphasized by the United States Supreme Court
in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), and F. W.
Woolworth v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982). Following
numerous hearings and a great deal of comment by the tax bar and private industry,
the Revenue Cabinet withdrew the regulation. See 22 K.A.R. E3 (Nov. 1, 1995).
30 See, e.g., G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Ky.
1988); Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 748 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Ky.
1988).
31 Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 111 P.2d 334,341 (Cal. 1941), ajfd, 315 U.S. 501
(1942).
"[T]he unitary business concept is ... not, so to speak, unitary: there are
variations on the theme." Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 167
(1983). For an extensive discussion of alternative methods to determine whether
a multi-corporate group constitutes a unitary business, see, for example, 1110 Tax
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and required a specific factual determination as to whether a particular
taxpayer constituted a unitary business.32
In two reported decisions in the 1980s, Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue
Cabinet and Kentucky Department ofRevenue v. The Early & Daniel Co.,33
the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the Revenue Cabinet's requirement that
a multi-corporate group that constituted a unitary business file a combined
income tax return. In both of these cases, the unitary group included a
domestic international sales corporation ("DISC"). 34 The DISCs owned no
property, retained no employees other than their officers and directors, and
made no sales themselves.35 Following these cases, the Revenue Cabinet
issued Revenue Policy 41P225 interpreting the cases36 as limiting combined
income tax reporting to unitary groups that include sham or paper corpora-
tions.
Management Multistate Tax Portfolios: Income Taxes: Definition of a Unitary
Business (1996); JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, I STATE
TAXATION: CORPORATION INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES 8.11 (2d ed. 1993).
For additional discussions of the unitary business concept, see, for example,
Charles E. McLure, Jr., Defining a Unitary Business: An Economist's View,
reprinted in ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON STATE TAXATION OF
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CORPORATIONS 47 (1986); E. George Rudolph, State
Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated
Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171 (1970); Frank M. Kessling & John S.
Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42
(1960).
32See 1996 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 2.
3 Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 748 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1988);
Kentucky Dep't of Revenue v. The Early & Daniel Co., 628 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.
1982).
34 A DISC was a corporate entity given special federal income tax treatment to
encourage exports by U.S. firms. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 991-997. For a discussion of the
reasons for the DISC preferential tax treatment, see H. Rep. No. 533 (1971),
reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1825, 1872; S. Rep. No. 437 (1971), reprinted in
1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1928, 1996. In 1984 Congress generally repealed the
DISC system of tax deferrals and replaced it with the less favorable foreign sales
corporation system of taxation. See 26 U.S.C. 921-927.
3 SeeArmco, Inc., 748 S.W.2dat375;Early&Daniel Co., 628 S.W.2d at 631.36 The Revenue Cabinet also relied on similar decisions by the Kentucky Board
of Tax Appeals and an unreported decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court, V.E.
Anderson v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 87-SC- 122-DG (Ky. Nov. 5,1987) (citing
Revenue Policy 41P225). See G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d
788, 790-91 (Ky. 1994) (discussing V.E. Anderson).
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In G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet,37 the Kentucky Supreme Court
struck down Revenue Policy 41P225 and held that a multi-corporate group
that constituted a unitary business had the right to file a combined income tax
return even if the group did not contain any sham or paper corporations.
Following this decision, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet proposed a regula-
tion, 103 KAR 16:190, that would have mandated combined reporting for
broadly defined unitary groups.3 The proposed regulation engendered so
much opposition from theKentucky corporate community3 9 that the Revenue
Cabinet withdrew the regulation.4
The Revenue Cabinet and the Kentucky business community then
worked together for a legislative compromise.4' That compromise, contained
in House Bill 599,42 permits affiliated corporations to choose between filing
their income tax returns on a separate orconsolidatedbasis, while prohibiting
them from changing that basis from year to year depending on which is more
advantageous in a particular year.43 Thus, effective for tax years beginning on
or after December 31, 1995, House Bill 599 amended sections 141.120 and
141.200 to allow members of an affiliated group to elect to file a consolidated
Kentucky income tax return regardless of whether the group filed a consoli-
dated federal income tax return.' If an election is made to file a consolidated
return, the statute requires that the election remain in force for an eight-year
period.45
The statute should eliminate much of the uncertainty in the corporate
income tax area by replacing combined reporting with the option of filing
37 G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1994).
31 See supra note 6.
3' For a brief summary of that criticism, see Kendall L. Houghton, Kentucky
Revenue Cabinet Gets Negative Feedback on Proposed Combined Reporting Reg,
95 STN 144-12 (July 27, 1995) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, STN File) (daily on-line
version of STATE TAXNOTES). For the text of the amended prop osed regulation and
excerpts from comments and responses to those comments, see Kentucky Revenue
Cabinet Amends Corporation Income Tax Reg, 95 STN 200-10 (Oct. 17, 1995)
(LEXIS, Fedtax Library, STN File) (daily on-line version of STATE TAX NOTES).
40 See Kentucky Revenue Cabinet Withdraws Proposed Reg Concerning
CombinedReporting Methodfor Corporation Income Tax Purposes, 9 STATE TAX
NOTES 1308 (Nov. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Cabinet Withdraws ProposedReg].
" See Laurel C. Farrell, The State of Combined Reporting Today, 96 STN
167-24 (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, STN File) (daily on-line version of STATE TAX
NOTES).
42 See id.
" See Cabinet Withdraws Proposed Reg, supra note 40.
44 See K.R.S. § 141.200(3)(a) (Michie Supp. 1996).
41 See id. § 141.200(3)(d).
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consolidated income tax returns." As noted above, combined reporting
applies to unitary businesses, and determining whether a multi-corporate
group constitutes a unitary business requires an intense factual determination
that must be applied on a taxpayer-specific basis.47 Consolidated income tax
returns, in contrast, may be filed by "affiliated groups," and affiliated groups
are determined simply by applying clear and well-established common
ownership rules."
The statute does not, however, eliminate all uncertainty. For example, it
does not apply to tax years beginning on or before December 31, 1995.
Moreover, it does not address issues such as net operating losses, capital
gains, and contributions made by members of the consolidated group.4 9
C. Bank Franchise and Local Deposit Tax Act- House Bill 416 1
Effective July 15,1996, House Bill 416 repealedKentucky's century-old
bank shares tax"' and replaced it with a franchise-based tax.52 The franchise
tax is imposed on every financial institution regularly engaged in business in
the Commonwealth at any time during the taxable year.' Generally, an
institution is presumed to be regularly engaged in business in the Common-
wealth if it solicits business from twenty or more persons in the state or it has
4See id. § 141.120(11) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed as allowing
or requiring the filing of a combined return under the unitary business concept or
a consolidated return."). Nevertheless, the Revenue Cabinet may maintain that
Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 748 S.W.2d 372 ( Ky. 1988), and
Department ofRevenue v. The Early & Daniel Co., 628 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1982),
provide it with the discretionary authority to require unitary combined reports. See
KPMG Survey Probes State, LocalBusiness Incentives, 95 STN 222-46 (November
17, 1995) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, STN File) (daily on-line version of STATE TAX
NOTES).
" See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
41 See K.P.S. § 141.200(l)(a) (defining affiliated groups with reference to
section 1504(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations).
41 See 1995 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 10.
50 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 254.
51 See K.R.S. § 136.270 (Michie. Supp. 1996), repealed by 1996 Ky. Acts ch.
254, § 39, effective July 15, 1996.
52 The provision applies retroactively to January 1, 1996, for financial
institutions doing business in Kentucky on the effective date of the legislation. See
Mark F. Sommer, Bank Tax Rewrite Becomes Law AfterLobbying Blitz, 12 STATE
TAXNOTES 1357, 1358 (May 6, 1996).
" See K.R.S. § 136.505(1).
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receipts from Kentucky sources of $100,000 or more during a taxable
year.' The franchise tax is imposed at the rate of 1.1% of net capital (after
apportionment if the institution does business both within and outside the
state),55 with a minimum tax payable of $300 per year. 6
Net capital is determined over a five-year period by adding together
paid-in capital, surplus, undivided profits and capital reserves, net
unrealized gains or losses on certain securities, and cumulative foreign
currency translation adjustments, and then deducting from the total an
amount equal to the same percentage of the total as the book value of
United States obligations bears to the book value of the total assets of the
financial institution.57 Net capital includes equity related to investment in
subsidiaries.58
The franchise tax is assessed in lieu of all other city, county, and local
taxes, except the real estate transfer tax, real and tangible personal property
taxes, utilities taxes, and local deposit franchise taxes.59 A "little-noticed"
provision authorizes cities, counties, and urban-county governments to
impose a tax on any bank having a branch located within the jurisdiction's
limits. 6' The rate imposed by cities and counties may not exceed .025% of
the deposits held by the financial institutions located within their jurisdic-
tion, while the rate imposed by urban-county governments may not exceed
.050% of deposits.62 As of early 1997, only a few Kentucky municipalities
had enacted the tax, but numerous others were either considering it or
taking steps to implement it.63
54 See id. § 136.520(1). Receipts from interests in certain types ofproperty, such
as real estate mortgage investment conduits and real investment trusts, are excluded
in determining whether an institution is regularly engaged in business in Kentucky.
See id.
s See id. §§ 136.525-.540.
56Seeid. § 136.510.
57Seeid. § 136.515.
58 See id. § 136.515(2)(b).
See id. § 136.505(2).60 Mark F. Sommer, Cities Move to Adopt Local Bank Taxes, 12 STATE TAX
NOTES 578 (Feb. 24, 1997).
61 See K.R.S. § 136.575.
62See id. § 136.575(2).
63See Sommer, supra note 52, at 578. Although the local deposits franchise tax
was intended to replace the Kentucky bank share tax, the new tax may be imposed
by local governments that did not formerly levy the bank shares tax. Conversely,
local jurisdictions that imposed the bank shares tax may elect not to impose the
franchise tax, or impose a different tax rate, so long as the maximum rate is not
[VOL. 86
TAXATION
A "potentially troublesome"' provision of the Act65 may prohibit
financial institutions from seeking to enforce security interests or collect
on loans in Kentucky courts until the financial institutions pay franchise
taxes and file appropriate franchise tax returns:
Any financial institution subject to the annual franchise tax imposed by
KRS 136.505 that fails to file areturn as required by KRS 135.545 or that
fails to pay the tax as listed on the return shall not maintain an action, suit,
or proceeding in any court or before any agency in this Commonwealth
or enforce in any way any obligation of any debts until the return is filed
and the tax listed on the return is paid.66
As noted above, the Act sets forth extremely broad nexus standards. It
subjects "[e]very financial institution regularly engaged in business" 67 in
the Commonwealth to the franchise tax and presumes that an institution is
regularly engaged in business in the Commonwealth if it solicits business
from twenty or more persons in the state or has receipts from Kentucky
sources of $100,000 or more during a taxable year.68 Thus, under the Act,
a financial institution located in Miami, Florida, that simply mails credit
card applications to twenty Kentucky residents is presumed to be regularly
engaged in business in the state even though it has no physical presence in
the state.
Although the Act provides that its nexus provision is to "be interpreted
to reach to the limits permitted by the United States Constitution," 69 it may
in fact exceed federal constitutional limits. In Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota,7" the United States Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause
requires that an out-of-state seller have some physical presence in the state
before the state can impose use tax collection responsibilities on that
seller.7' If Quill's physical-presence standard applies to the franchise tax,
exceeded. See Local Deposits Franchise Tax Provisions Clarified, 57 State Tax
Review (CCII) 11 (Nov. 4, 1996) (citing Kentucky Tax Alert, Kentucky Revenue
Cabinet (Sept. 1996)).
4 Mark F. Sommer, Bank Franchise Tax Act Contains Tough Enforcement
Provision, 11 STATE TAx NOTES 1428 (Nov. 18, 1996).
61 See K.R.S. § 136.570(2).
6Id.
67 1d. § 136.505(1).
68 See id. § 136.520(1).
691d. § 136.520(2).
70 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
7' See id. at 314-19.
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then the Act's nexus provision clearly violates the United States Constitu-
tion.
Whether Quill's physical-presence requirement applies to the Kentucky
bank franchise tax, however, is not entirely clear. Quill left open the
question whether its physical-presence standard applies to taxes other than
sales and use taxes.72 The Court noted that it had not, "in [its] review of
other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence requirement."'
Thus, opinion as to Quill's reach has been divided. In Geojfey, Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission,4 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the state could tax the income of a corporation that had no physical
presence in the state where the income was derived from intangible
property owned by the corporation and used within the state.75 In contrast,
72 See Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional Nexus,
Intangible Property, and the State Taxation oflncome, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 407,
407 (1994) ("Quill left unanswered whether a state can tax the income of a
corporation which is not physically present in the state where the income is derived
from intangible property owned by the corporation and used within the state.");
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, II STATE TAXATION: SALES
AND USE, PERSONAL, INCOME, AND DEATH AND GIFT TAXES 6.08[1], at S6-6
(1996/1997 Supp.) [hereinafter HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION]
("A major unresolved question left unanswered by the Supreme Court's holding in
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota is whether the physical presence requirement of the
vendor in the State as a sine qua non of the State's constitutional power to require
the vendor to collect its use tax on sales of property delivered to the purchaser in
the State applies to other taxes, particularly to corporate franchise and income
taxes.").
For more detailed discussions of the Quill decision, see, for example, Anna M.
Hoti, Comment, Finishing What Quill Started: The Transactional Nexus Testfor
State Use Tax Collection, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 1449 (1996); Kathryn L. Moore,
State and Local Taxation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce: The Second Best
Solution, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 1425, 1445-50 (1996); David F. Shores, State
Taxation ofInterstate Commerce: Quill, Allied Signal, and a Proposal, 72 NEB. L.
REV. 682 (1993); Pamela M. Krill, Note, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota: Tax Nexus
Under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses No Longer the Same, 1993 WISC.
L. REV. 1405 (1993).
7' Quill, 504 U.S. at 314.
74 Geoffrey, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C.), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
992 (1993).
7 See id. at 23-24. Even if a Kentucky court were to follow Geojiey, it appears
that a foreign corporation with only intangible property in the state would not have
to pay Kentucky income tax. Every corporation with property located in the state
is subject to state income tax. See K.R.S. § 141.040 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1996).
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Cerro Copper Products, Inc. v. Department of Revenue76 rejected
Geoffrey's Commerce Clause analysis and held that the Commerce Clause
requires that before the state can impose income tax on a corporation, it
must have a physical presence in the state. Similarly, commentators have
disagreed as to whether the Quill's physical-presence requirement should
extend to other taxes.' Thus, the constitutionality of the bank franchise
tax's nexus provision is in doubt.
D. Inheritance Tax -House Bill 278
Before January 1995, Kentucky's inheritance tax79 was one ofthe most
burdensome taxes imposed by the state." The tax applied to estates valued
at less than $600,000 even though most states and the federal government
did not impose taxes on such estates.81 In January 1995, the Kentucky
General Assembly enacted House Bill 2, which phased out the inheritance
The state, however, is allocated only real and tangible personal property located in
the state. Id. § 141.120(8)(a) (Supp. 1996). Thus, even if the state had the nexus to
tax the foreign corporation with intangibles in the state, no income would be
allocated to the state through the state's allocation formula.76DocketNo. F. 94-444, Final Order (Dec. 11, 1995), reprinted in 95 STN 242-
1 (Dec. 18, 1995) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, STN File) (daily online version of
STATE TAX NOTES).
" Compare Fatale, supra note 72 (supporting Geoffiey decision) with Richard
L. Lieberman & Stewart Lipeles, The Geoffrey Case: A Failed Attempt to Provide
Content to the Economic Nexus Principle, 65 STATE TAX NOTES 13 (Mar. 14,
1994) (criticizing Geoffrey). Indeed, the leading father-son team in state and local
taxation, Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, disagree as to whether
Quill's physical-presence requirement should apply to income taxes. Compare
Jerome R. Hellerstein, Geoffrey and the Physical Presence Nexus Requirement of
Quill, 8 STATE TAXNOTEs 671 (Feb. 13, 1995) (supporting Geoffirey) with Walter
Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation of Intangibles Generates Increasing
Controversy, 80 J. TAx'N 296 (1994) (criticizing Geoffrey).
78 1995 Ky. Acts ch. 2 (codified as amended at K.R.S. §§ 140.070 - .080
(Michie 1995)).
71 See K.R.S. §§ 140.010- .120 (Michie 1995).
" See generally John S. Lueken, Kentucky Inheritance Tax Update, in 1997
UPDATE, supra note 9, at V1; see also CCH Tax Day: State, Mar. 9, 1995,
available in Westlaw S95-068-012 (then-Kentucky Governor Brereton C. Jones
noted that Kentucky's inheritance tax is highest state inheritance tax in the
country).
81 See Lueken, supra note 80, at V1.
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tax as applied to "Class A" beneficiaries over a number of years ending on
July 1, 1998.2
Class A beneficiaries include any
parent, surviving spouse, child by blood, stepchild, child adopted during
infancy, child adopted during adulthood who was reared by the decedent
during infancy or a grandchild who is the issue of a child by blood, the
issue of a stepchild, the issue of a child adopted during adulthood who
was reared by the decedent during infancy, the issue of a child adopted
during infancy, brother sister, or brother or sister of the half blood.83
For beneficiaries of decedents dying after June 30, 1998, no Kentucky
inheritance tax is imposed on inheritable interests passing to Class A
beneficiaries.84
The Kentucky inheritance tax, however, remains in effect for Class B
and Class C beneficiaries.85 Class B beneficiaries include any "nephew,
niece, or a nephew or niece of the half blood, daughter-in-law, son-in-law,
aunt or uncle, or a great-grandchild who is the grandchild of a child by
blood, of a stepchild or of a child adopted during infancy."86 The first
$1000 received by a Class B beneficiary is exempt from tax. 7 After that,
an inheritance tax ranging from four percent on inheritable assets valued
at no more than $10,000 to sixteen percent on inheritable assets valued
at more than $200,000 is imposed on inheritances by Class B
beneficiaries.88
Class C beneficiaries include any educational, religious, or other
institutions, societies, or associations; any cities, towns, or public
82 1995 Ky. Acts ch. 2 (codified in K.R.S. §§ 140.070 and 140..080 (Michie
Supp. 1996)).
83 K.R.S. § 140.070(1) (Michie Supp. 1996). House Bill 2 amended section
140.070 to expand Class A beneficiaries to include brothers, sisters, and brothers
and sisters of the half blood. Before House Bill 2, brothers, sisters, and brothers and
sisters of the half blood qualified as Class B beneficiaries.
See id. § 140.080(1)(c)(4).
Unlike the federal estate tax, which is a tax imposed on the estate's right to
transfer wealth to designated beneficiaries, the Kentucky inheritance tax is atax on
the right to receive assets and is imposed on the value of property passing to
individual beneficiaries. See Lueken, supra note 80, at V-2.
86 K.R.S. § 140.070(2). Before House Bill 2, brothers, sisters, and brothers and
sisters of the half blood qualified as Class B beneficiaries.87See id. § 140.090(1)(d).
88See id. § 140.070(2).
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institutions not exempted by section 140.060;9 or any person not included
in Class A or Class B. 0 The first $500 received by a Class C beneficiary is
exempt from tax.91 After that, an inheritance tax ranging from six percent
on inheritable assets valued at no more than $10,000 to sixteen percent on
inheritable assets valued at more than $60,000 is imposed on inheritances
by Class C beneficiaries.92
E. Use Tax Nexus -House Bill 617 93
As noted above,94 in Quill the United States Supreme Court held that the
Commerce Clause requires that an out-of-state seller have some physical pre-
sence in the state before the state can impose use tax collection responsibility
on that seller. Although it described the physical-presence requirement as a
"bright-line rule,"95 the Court never precisely defined the physical presence
necessary to satisfy the Commerce Clause substantial nexus requirement. 96
'
91d. § 140.060 (Michie 1991). This section provides:
All transfers to educational, religious or other institutions, societies, or
associations, whose sole object and purpose are to carry on charitable,
educational, or religious work, all transfers for or upon trust for any
charitable, educational, or religious purpose, and all transfers to cities, and
towns or public institutions in this state for public purposes shall be exempt
from the tax imposed by this chapter....
Id.
90 See id. § 140.070(3) (Michie Supp. 1996).
9' See id. § 140.090(I)(e) (Michie 1991).
92See id. § 140.070(3) (Michie Supp. 1996).
9 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 215 (codified as amended at K.R.S. § 139.340).
See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
9' Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,314-19 (1992).96 See id. at 315 n.8 (concluding that Quill's licensing of software in the state
failed to constitute a "substantial nexus" but declining to define what contacts
would in fact constitute "substantial nexus"); see also Laura A. Kulwicki,
Continuing State Trends in Nexus Enforcement after Quill: The Struggle To Define
"SubstantialNexus, "6 STATE TAXNOTES 345,345 (Feb. 7, 1994) ("[T]his 'bright
line' is not quite as bright as it first seems."); Direct Marketing.Association Official
Speaks on the Quill Victory at Tax Administrators 'Meeting, 92 STN 125-22 (June
29, 1992) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, STN File) (daily on-line version of STATE TAX
NOTES) (noting that although the Bellas Hess physical-presence test was called a
"bright line" test, this is a relative term).
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Accordingly, states and courts have since struggledwith the parameters ofthe
physical-presence requirement.97
On December 20, 1995, the Multistate Tax Commission, working with
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia,98 issued National Nexus
Program Bulletin 95-11 to provide some content to the standard. 100 The
bulletin provides that an out-of-state computer vendor generally has
nexus with the market state for purposes of both sales and use tax
collection and income tax if the vendor contracts with a third party to
provide buyers with repair services for their computers under the vendor's
warranty.10
1
97 See Kulwicki, supra note 96, at 346-47 (discussing then-pending litigation
regarding the meaning of the substantial nexus requirement); Kim Marshall & Marc
Lewis, What We Know TodayAbout Substantial Nexus, 13 STATE TAXNOTES 967
(Oct. 13, 1997) (discussing current state legislation and case law on Quill's
substantial nexus requirement); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 330-31 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("milt is a sure bet that the vagaries of 'physical presence' will be tested
to their fullest in our courts."); Charles Rothfeld, Quill: Confising the Commerce
Clause, 3 STATE TAx NOTES 111, 111 (July 27, 1992) (stating that taxpayers and
taxing officials will not be able to determine adequacy of physical presence
because it is not based on clear principle). Compare Michael C. Hamersley, Note,
Will the Bellas Hess Physical Presence Requirement Continue to Protect Out-of-
State Mail-Order Retailers from State Use Taxes in the Quill Era? Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 46 TAX LAW. 515, 521-23 (1993) (contending that Quill requires
"substantial physical presence"); with Alice J. Davis, How Much Is Too Little?
DefiningDeMinimus SubstantialNexus, 7 STATETAxNOTES 1983, 1985-86 (Dec.
26, 1994) (criticizing recent New York decisions that relied on Hamersley's Note
in finding that Quill's nexus requirement demands "substantial physical presence").
98 Kentucky was not one of those states, as it is not a member of the Multistate
Tax Commission.
99NB 95-1 (Dec. 20, 1995), Computer Company's Provision ofln-State Repair
Services Creates Nexus, 95 STIN 246-71 (Dec. 22, 1995) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
STN File) (daily on-line version of STATE TAX NOTES).
" The Multistate Tax Commission views the Bulletin as "an authoritative
description of the audit position of the signatory states regarding companies
engaged in the cross-border sale of computers." Richard D. Pomp & Michael J.
McIntyre, State Taxation of Mail-Order Sales of Computers After Quill; An
Evaluation of MTC Bulletin 95-1, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 177, 177 (1996).
.0. The bulletin is simply a refinement of the Multi-State Tax Commission's
"long-standing position that a mail-order seller has nexus with a state and may be
required by a state to collect the use tax if it has a service representative in that state
who regularly acts on its behalf." Id.
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Although MTC Bulletin 95-1 has been controversial,10 2 and one of the
original twenty-five states supporting the bulletin, California, has since
withdrawn its support,"°3 Kentucky adopted MTC Bulletin 95-i's nexus
standards for use tax purposes in House Bill 617.11 Effective July 15, 1996,
House Bill 617 amended section 139.340 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
to extend use tax collection responsibilities to retailers soliciting orders for
tangible personal property from residents of the state "if the retailer
benefits from an agent operating in this state under the authority of the
retailer to repair or service tangible personal property sold by the
retailer."'05
F. Health Care Provider Taxes -House Bill 1' and House Bill 397107
In 1993, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted House Bill 1,108
which imposed health care provider taxes on various health care groups."°
First, it imposed on hospitals a 2.5% tax on gross revenues for the
provision of health care items or services or hospital services.10 Second,
it imposed a 2% provider tax on gross revenues for the provision of nursing
facility services, intermediate care facility services for the mentally
102 See, e.g., id. (defending bulletin and discussing some of the criticism);
Richard A. Hanson, 95-1 Defenders Take Note: Quill Court Made Its Case, 11
STATETAXNOTES 431 (Aug. 5,1996) (criticizing Pomp and McIntyre article); Eric
J. Miethke, Man the Pumps! A Response to Pomp and McIntyre's Analysis of
Bulletin 95-1, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 307 (July 15, 1996) (same); Michael J.
McIntyre & Richard D. Pomp, Letter to Editor: Quill's Novelty was Tax Nexus
Bifurcation, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 588 (Aug. 19, 1996) (responding to Hanson
critique); Richard D. Pomp & Michael J. McIntyre, Adrft Without a Rudder -A
Response to Seaman Miethke, 96 STN 157-44 (Aug. 13, 1996) (LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, STN File) (daily on-line version of STATE TAX NOTES) (responding to
Miethke criticism).
1o3 See Marshall & Lewis, supra note 97.
i4Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 215, § 1 (codified in K.R.S. § 139.340 (Michie Supp.
1996)).
105K.R.S. § 130.340(2)(e).
106 1993 Ky. Acts ch. 2, now repealed; see infra note 109.
107 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 110 (codified at K.R.S. § 142.309).
"1S 1993 Ky. Acts ch. 2, now repealed; see infra note 109.
09 See K.R.S. §§ 142.201-259,216.270-287, repealed and replacedwith K.R.S.
§§ 142.301-359, 216.2901-2960; see also Assembly Enacts Tax on Health Care
Providers, 5 STATE TAX NOTES 73 (July 12, 1993).
"o See 1993 Ky. Acts ch. 2, § 2.
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retarded, physician services, home health care services, and health
maintenance organization services.'11 Finally, it imposed a tax of $0.25 per
prescription on pharmacies. 12
In 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly repealed and replaced the
health care provider taxes imposed in House Bill 13 with a new set of
health care providertaxes underHouseBill 250.114 The health care provider
taxes under House Bill 250 are substantially similar to those under House
Bill 1, with one exception. House Bill 1 permitted pharmacies to pass the
$0.25 per prescription tax onto insurers, health maintenance organizations,
and non-profit hospital, medical-surgical, dental, and health service
corporations, but did not permit the latter groups to pass on the tax."5
House Bill 250, in contrast, does not permit pharmacies to pass the
prescription tax on to third-party payers.'1 6
Shortly after the provider taxes were enacted, physicians filed suit
claiming that the 2% provider tax impermissibly singled them out in
violation of section 59(15) of the Kentucky Constitution." 7 Although the
Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the tax against the physicians' challenge
in Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Smith,"' the General Assembly was
receptive to the physicians' complaints. In 1996, it enacted House Bill
397,19 which phases out the 2% provider tax (as applied to physicians)
over a four-year period.120 The amendment does not affect the 2.5%
provider tax on hospital services,' 2 ' the 2% tax on other providers of health
care services," or the $0.25 per prescription tax on prescription drugs."
.. See H.B. 1 (1993), Enact. Acts 1993, ch. 2, § 3 (2d Ex. Sess.), now repealed;
supra note 109.
1 2 See H.B. 1, 1993 Ky. Acts ch. 2, § 4.
"
3 See 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 512, § 119 (repealing scattered sections of K.R.S. ch.
142).
" 
4 See id. §§ 97-101 (amending scattered sections of K.R.S. ch. 142).
.. See H.R. 1, 1993 Ky. Acts ch. 2, § 4, now repealed; see supra note 109.
..6 See 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 512, § 99.
..
7 See Mark F. Sommer, Physicians Group Sues Over Health Care Provider
Tax, 5 STATE TAx NOTES 185 (July 26, 1993).
"' Kentucky Revenue Cabinetv. Smith, 875 S.W.2d 873 (Ky.), cert. deniedsub
nom. Yeoman v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994).
"I Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 110, § 2 (codified atK.R.S. § 142.309 (Michie Supp.
1996)).
120 See K.R.S. § 142.309.
121 See id. § 142.303.
2 See id. § 142.307.
3 See id. § 142.311.
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G. Unmined Minerals - House Bill 84 124
In 1976, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted a statute classifying
unmined coal separately from other real estate.'25 Two years later, the
General Assembly enacted a statute taxing unmined coal at the rate of one-
tenth of one cent ($.001) per one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed
value.126 In Gillis v. Yount, 127 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
classifying unmined coal separately from other unmined minerals violated
section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution. 28
In 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly enactedHouse Bill 84, which
requires that the Revenue Cabinet value and assess unmined coal, oil, and
gas reserves that have been severed from the surface estate at no more than
fair market value in place, considering all relevant circumstances. 29 The
Act further provides that unmined coal, oil, and gas reserves, as well as
other mineral or energy sources, are to be valued and assessed as separate
interests in real property, distinct from the surface estate. 3
H. Repair, Replacement, or Spare Parts - House Bill 455 3
Section 139.480 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes exempts from
sales and use taxes purchases of machinery for new and expanded
industry. 3 2 To qualify for this exemption, the machinery or equip-
ment must be used directly in the manufacturing or production pro-
cess, and either must not replace machinery or must replace machinery
that will increase the consumption of recycled materials at a facility by
not less than ten percent.' In Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Armco,
124 Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 263 (codified at K.R.S. § 132.820 and codified as
amended at K.R.S. § 132.010).
"~ See 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 84, § 7.
'
26 See K.R.S. § 132.020(5).
'
27Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1988).
'2 The majority did not reach the issue of whether the one mil tax also violated
section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution. See id. at 358.
129 See K.R.S. § 132.820(1).
130 See id.
3' Enact. Acts. 1994, ch. 501 (codified at K.R.S. §§ 139.170 and .470).
132 See K.R.S. § 139.480(10).
'"I See id. § 139.170(1). The regulations provide that four specific requirements
be met for machinery to qualify for the exemption:
(1) It must be machinery.
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Inc.,'34 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a spare part that the vendor
required the manufacturer to purchase with the original machinery was
exempt machinery for new and expanded industry.' The court also held
that ball bearings Armco used were exempt industrial supplies.13 6
In 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly overruled Armco, Inc. by
enacting House Bill 455, which amends section 139.170 of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes to provide that "'machinery for new and expanded
industry' does not include repair, replacement, or spare parts of any kind
regardless of whether the purchase of repair, replacement or spare parts is
required by the manufacturer or vendor as a condition of sale or as a
condition of warranty."'137 House Bill 455 also amended section 139.170 to
provide that "'[r]epair, replacement, or spare parts' does not include
machine oils, grease, or industrial tools.' ' 38 Finally, House Bill 455
amended section 139.470, which exempts, among other things, supplies
from sales and use tax. As amended, section 139.470(1 1)(a)(2) concludes
that "[s]upplies [do] not include repair, replacement, or spare parts of any
kind."'139
(2) It must be used directly in the manufacturing process.
(3) It must be incorporated for the first time into plant facilities
established in this state.
(4) It must not replace other machinery.
103 KY. ADMrN. REGS. 30:120(1) (1997).
In Camera Center, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS 1,
the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals held that photographic processing equipment
used by a retailer of cameras, film, and other photographic supplies did not qualify
as exempt machinery for new and expanded industry because it was not
incorporated into the plant facilities in the state for the first time.
13 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Armco, Inc., 838 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. Ct. App.
1992).
131 See id. at 402.
136 See id.
137 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 501, § 1(1) (codified at K.R.S. § 139.170(1)).
38 K.R.S. § 139.170(2)(a).
139 Subsection (b) of this section provides:
It shall be noted that in none of the three (3) categories is any exemption
provided for repair, replacement, or spare parts. Repair, replacement, or
spare parts shall not be considered to be materials, supplies, or industrial
tools directly used in manufacturing or industrial processing. Repair,





I. Taxation ofRetirement Income -House Bill 1140
In Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury,' the United States
Supreme Court struck down a Michigan statute that imposed state income
tax on federal pensioners while exempting state pensioners from that tax.142
The Court found that the scheme violated the federal constitutional doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity. 43 In 1990, the Kentucky legislature
amended section 141.021144 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to exempt
federal retirement benefits from state income tax in order to correct its
prior taxing scheme, which, like the Michigan scheme, had exempted state
pensioners while taxing federal pensioners.1
45
Following theDavis decision, federal pensioners in Kentucky filed suit,
claiming a refund of taxes they had paid under the pre- 1990 scheme. 46 The
Revenue Cabinet conceded that the old statutory scheme was invalid, but
contested the refund claim by claiming that the decision was not retroac-
tive. 47 In Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum,148 the Kentucky Supreme
140 Enact. Acts 1995, ch. 1 (2d Ex. Sess.) (codified at K.R.S. § 141.0 10(i)).
'4 Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
142 See id. at 817.
143 For a more detailed discussion of the Davis decision, see, for example,
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 72, 22.04[3];
Corinna L. Eckl et al., State Taxation ofPublic Pensions: The Impact ofDavis v.
Michigan, 47 TAX NOTES at 1119 (May 28, 1990).
'4 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 305, § 1 (codified at K.R.S. § 141.021 (Michie 1991)).
'45In Finley v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 1996 Ky. Tax LEXIS 373, *3 (Ky.
Bd. Tax App.), the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals found that the post-1990
scheme did "not exempt from tax retirement income received from a retirement or
pension plan of a state other than the Commonwealth of Kentucky."
146 See Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky.
1994).
14 See id. For a more detailed discussion of the retroactivity and refund issues,
see, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731 (1991); Eric
Rakowski, Harper and Its Aftermath, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 445 (1993); David F.
Shores, Recovery of Unconstitutional Taxes: A New Approach, 12 VA. TAX REV.
167 (1992); Linda K. Webster, Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury: The
Retroactivity Morass in Refunds ofState Taxes, 138 MIL. L. REv. 127 (1992); Carl
D. Ciochon, Note, Nonretroactivity in Constitutional Tax Refund Cases, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 419 (1992); see also Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994); Harper
v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling Co.
v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith; 496 U.S. 167
(1990).
148 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1994).
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Court held that the Davis decision applied retroactively 4 9 and that federal
pensioners in Kentucky were entitled to a refund of income taxes paid
under Kentucky's similar unconstitutional scheme.' 0 The court further held
that Kentucky's two-year statute of limitations for refunds of unconstitu-
tional taxes, found in section 134.590 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes,
applied, rather than the four-year statute of limitations for refunds of taxes
other than ad valorem and unconstitutional taxes found in section
134.580.151 Finally, the court held that the two years began to run from the
date the tax involved was paid, rather than from the date the complaint was
filed or the decision was finalized. 52
In Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Cope,"' private pensioners brought a
challenge under section 59(15) of the Kentucky Constitution5 4 to the post-
1990 scheme that exempted the pensions of public sector employees while
taxing private pensioners. The court found that the distinction between
governmental and private sector employees was not unreasonable or
arbitrary, and therefore upheld the statutory scheme.151
Notwithstanding the court's decision in Cope, the Kentucky General
Assembly again amended its income taxing scheme in 1995 to equalize
14 See id. at 332 ("Harper is unambiguous in its holding that Davis applies
retroactively .... ).
' 
0 See id. at 333.
'' See id. at 333-35.
'12 See id. at 335. The trial court had held that claims must be made within two
years from the date the amount due was determined through litigation. See id. at
331.
' Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Cope, 875 S.W.2d 87 (Ky.), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 931 (1994).
"' Section 59(15) prohibits "local or special acts" that are "to authorize or to
regulate the levy, the assessment or the collection of taxes, or to give any
indulgence or discharge to any assessor or collector of taxes, or to his sureties."
The pensioners in Cope also challenged the statutory scheme under section 2 of the
Kentucky Constitution, but the court quickly dismissed that challenge. See id. at 92.
... See id. at 90. Pointing to the lack of profit motive in the public sector, the
restrictions imposed on the government in setting pay, and the lower pay scale of
governmental employees, the court noted that the statute would have survived even
a more rigorous standard of review. See id. at 90-91. For an editorial criticizing the
court's decision, see Injustice on Pensions: Decision Leaves Equal Protection
Intact, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Feb. 2, 1994, at A10; see
also Jack Brammer & Chad Carlton, Pension Tax Ruling Saves State Millions,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Feb. 1, 1994, at Al; Pension
Ruling a Slap in the Face, Private-sector Retirees Say, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Feb. 1, 1994, at A6.
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prospectively the treatment of pension benefits received by public and
private pensioners. 56 It phased in, over a several-year period ending on
January 1, 1998, a $35,000 exclusion, adjusted for inflation,' for
distributions18 from pension plans, annuity contracts, profit-sharing plans,
retirement plans, and employee savings plans. 59 For state and federal
retirees, it grandfathered in the taxation of pension benefits so that pension
benefits that exceed the $35,000 exclusion are taxable only to the extent
they are attributable to earnings after January 1, 1998.160
II. JuDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Intangibles Tax
In St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet,'6' the Kentucky Supreme
Court addressed challenges to two Kentucky taxing statutes: section
132.030 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which taxed out-of-state bank
deposits at a higher rate than in-state deposits; and section 136.030(1),
which exempted from taxation the stock of corporations that paid taxes to
the state on at least seventy-five percent of their total property. The court
held that section 132.030 impermissibly discriminated against interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause and thus struck down the
taxing statute. Withrespectto section 136.030(1), however, the court found
that despite the fact that it facially discriminated against interstate
commerce, it did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was a valid
compensating tax under Darnell v. Indiana.162
'
56 See 1995 Ky. Acts ch. 1 (2d Ex. Sess.) (codified at K.R.S. §§ 141.010 &
141.010(5) (Michie Supp. 1996)).
"
5 7 See id. at ch. 1, § 10 (2d Ex. Sess.) (codified at K.R.S. § 141.010(5)).
'
58 Distributions are defined to include any lump-sum distribution from pension
or profit-sharing plans qualifying for the income tax averaging provisions of
section 402 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"); any distribution from any
individual retirement account as defined in section 408 of the IRC; and any
disability pension distribution that is taxed as pension and annuity income for
federal income tax purposes. See K.R.S. § 141.010(10)(i)(3)(a).
" 1995 Ky. Acts ch. 1, § 1 (2d Ex. Sess.) (adding K.R.S. § 141.010(10)(i)).
"
60 See K.R.S. § 141.0215 (Michie Supp. 1996).
161 St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 912 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1995),
vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996), on remand, 942 S.W.2d 893 (Ky.),
cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).62Damell v. Indiana, 226 U.S. 390 (1912).
1997-98]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Following the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in St. Ledger, the
United States Supreme Court decided Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner.6 In that
case, the Court held that a North Carolina intangibles taxing scheme that
was substantially similar to the Kentucky scheme violated the Commerce
Clause.'" In striking down the North Carolina taxing scheme, the Court
declared that Darnell no longer represented goodlaw under the Commerce
Clause. 61
After deciding Fulton, the United States Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the Kentucky Supreme Court's judgment in St. Ledger v.
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet 66 in light of Fulton.67 On remand, the
Kentucky Supreme Court noted that both parties agreed that section
136.030(1) violated the Commerce Clause in light of Fulton.'6 The court
then held that section 136.030(1) could not be severed from section
132.020 and that the appellants were entitled to a refund of the unconstitu-
tional taxes paid for two years before filing of their refund applications. 69
The intangibles tax dispute is discussed in more detail in a Note in this
issue. 70
B. Unmined Minerals Tax
Before 1988, section 132.020(5) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
provided a taxing scheme for unmined coal by classifying it separately
from other real property and taxing it at the rate $.001 per $100 of assessed
value.' In Gillis v. Yount, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that this de
facto tax exemption violated section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution,
which requires uniformity in property taxation. Following the court's
decision, the property valuation administrators in each county began to
'
63Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
'"See id. at 327. The North Carolina intangibles tax was imposed on "a
fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely
proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax." Id.
I6 See id. at 346.
166 St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996).
167 See id. at 1821.
168 See St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 942 S.W.2d 893, 896 (1997).
The court also let its decision striking down the bank deposit tax stand. See id.
169 See id. at 903.
170 See Alsip et al., supra note 2.
171 See Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Ky. 1988).
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assess unmined coal for property tax purposes.172 In 1988, the Franklin
Circuit Court entered atemporary injunction requiring the Revenue Cabinet
to centralize the assessment of unmined coal." Pursuant to the temporary
injunction, the Cabinet decided to adopt and implement a Geographic
Information System ("GIS") to assess unmined coal. 74 Because the GIS
was very complicated, costly, and time-consuming, the Cabinet adopted an
interim methodto assess unminedcoal fortax years 1989 through 1991.'75
Under the interim method, the Cabinet mailed an information return
form to owners of unmined coal, coal operators, lessees, and permit
holders. 76 Taxpayers were asked to report on the forms "ownership
information, the number of acres of minable and merchantable coal, the
average seam thickness, the location of the coal by county, and whether the
coal was idle, permitted or permitted and producing." 177 Taxpayers also
were asked to provide any additional information that would aid in valuing
the coal resource. 7 The Cabinet applied a formula to the information
obtained from the returns to value the unmined coal and did not independ-
ently survey or inspect any property in making valuations. 79
Owners of tracts of coal filed suit claiming the interim method violated
the Kentucky Constitution because it did not consider certain individual
characteristics of the property that could affect the property's value. 80 In
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gillig, an opinion that has not yet become
final,' the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
interim method. The Court held that for tax purposes, a tax assessor is
allowed to use mass appraisal techniques to value property.'$2 Under the
mass appraisal approach, all the individual characteristics of property need
not be considered so long as those factors that allow the assessor to make
a logical estimate of the property's value are taken into account.'83 Section
'1 See Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gillig, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 91, "1-2 (1997)
(decision not final).
173 See id. at *2.
174 See id.
175See id. at *24.
'76 See id. at *2-3.
177Id. at *3.
178 See id.
179 See id. at *34.
"I See id. at *4.
181 See id. at *1.




172 of the Kentucky Constitution requires that fair cash value be
"estimated" and does not require that a tax assessor achieve the level of
accuracy of private fee appraisers.1 4
C. License Tax
Section 136.070 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes imposes, with
specific enumerated exceptions, an annual license tax on "every corpora-
tion organized under the laws of this state, every corporation having its
commercial domicile in this state, and every foreign corporation owning or
leasing property located in this state or having one (1) or more individuals
receiving compensation in this state."185 The license tax is imposed at the
rate of $2.10 on each $1000 of capital employed in Kentucky, 86 and
defines capital as "capital stock, surplus, advances by affiliated companies,
intercompany accounts, borrowed moneys or any other accounts represent-
ing additional capital used and employed in the business.""1 7 Section
136.071 permits domestic holding companies to eliminate capital invested
in subsidiaries from the calculation of the license tax.181
In an unpublished opinion that subsequently was withdrawn, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that USX, a foreign holding company that
satisfied the requirements of section 136.071, but for the fact that it was not
domiciled in the state, was not entitled to rely on the statute to calculate its
license tax liability.8 9 Although the trial court had held the preferential tax
scheme unconstitutional and the Revenue Cabinet did not appeal that
portion of the judgment, the court of appeals held that USX was required
to base its license tax liability on the higher section 136.070 calculation
rather than the lower section 136.071 liability.' "A court may not strike
down a statute and then grant a remedy based upon the same statute."'19
In 1996, legislation was introduced to extend the favorable tax
treatment accorded by section 136.071 to all holding corporations,
184 See id. at *9.
185 K.R.S. § 136.070(1) (Michie Supp. 1996).
186 See id.
'
8 71d. § 136.070(2)(a).
188 See id. § 136.07 1.
89 See Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. USX Corp., No. 93-CA-000072-MR and
No. 93-CA-000123-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1994), reprinted in 1995 UPDATE, supra
note 8, at 122-30.




regardless of their domicile, but the General Assembly did not enact it.' 92
USX has since filed a second action challenging the preferential tax
treatment afforded by section 136.071 '93
In Kroger Co. v. Kentucky Department of Revenue, 194 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held that a positive balance in a deferred tax liability
account was includable as capital for purposes of the license tax because
it represented surplus that was available to the corporation for use in its
business. Including the positive balance in capital had the effect of
increasing capital subject to taxation. In the unpublished and subsequently
withdrawn USXKdecision, the court of appeals extended that treatment to a
negative balance in a deferred tax liability account because it represented
funds that were not available to the corporation for use in its business. 95
Extending inclusion in capital to negative balances in deferred tax accounts
had the effect of decreasing total capital subject to taxation. On December
1, 1995, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet formally adopted the USXAdecision
by revising Revenue Policy 41P520 to provide that both receivable and
payable balances in intercompany accounts and deferred tax benefits and
liabilities qualify as capital for purposes of section 136.070.196
Finally, in the unpublished and subsequently withdrawn UStdecision,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that capital invested in USX's
nonunitary subsidiaries was includable in its capital for purposes of the
license tax.197 Relying on Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet,198
which held that capital invested by a corporation in a subsidiary was
includable capital for purposes of the license tax, 199 the court rejected
USX's claim that the subsidiaries should not be includable in capital
because they were nonunitary.2' The court further rejected USX's claim
92 See Timothy C. Kimmel, Corporate License Tax and Bank Franchise Tax,
1997 UPDATE, supra note 9, at IV-5.
193 See id.
'4 Kroger Co. v. Kentucky Dep't of Revenue, 614 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981).
'
95 See Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. USX Corp., No. 93-CA-000072-MR and
No. 93-CA-000123-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1994), reprinted in 1995 UPDATE, supra
note 8, at 127-29.
196 See Revenue Policy 41P520 (Revised Dec. 1, 1995).
197 See USX, No. 93-CA-000072-MR and No. 93-CA-000123-MR, reprinted in
1995 UPDATE, supra note 8, at 130.
9
' Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 748 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1988).
19 See id. at 376.
200 See USX, No. 93-CA-000072-MR andNo. 93-CA-000 123-MR, reprinted in
1995 UPDATE, supra note 8, at 130. In Armco, the court made no mention of
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that the subsidiaries did not add value to USX.2"' The court declared, "USX
may use and invest its capital in many ways, all of which are calculated to
bring USX a profit. The investment vehicle chosen by a corporation for
its capital does not determine the applicability of the corporate license
tax."
202
D. Taxation of Cellular Telephone Companies
In Central Kentucky Cellular Telephone Co. v. Kentucky Revenue
Cabinet,23 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that cellular telephone
companies are telephone companies for purposes of section 136.120.20
The court declared that the fact that the cellular telephone companies
operate with technology that did not exist when the statute was adopted
does not prevent them from qualifying as telephone companies for
purposes of the statute.25 Rather, the term "telephone company" for
purposes of the statute is to be construed according to its general and
common usage, and cellular telephone companies are commonly under-
stood to be telephone companies. °6 Thus, cellular telephone companies are
subject to state taxation on their operating property pursuant to section
136.120.207
whether the subsidiaries were part of the company's unitary business. See Armco,
Inc., 748 S.W.2d at 376. In discussing whether Armco had to include its domestic
international sales corporation ("DISC") income for purposes of income taxation,
however, the court noted that Armco and its DISC operated a unitary business. See
id. at 375. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see supra notes 33-40 and
accompanying text.
201 See USX, No. 93-CA-000072-MR andNo. 93-CA-000123-MR, reprinted in
1995 UPDATE, supra note 8, at 130.
202 Id.
203 Central Kentucky Cellular Tel. Co. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 897
S.W.2d 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).2
'
4 See id. at 603. Section 136.120(1) lists several public service corporations,
including telephone companies, and requires that each of the listed corporations
"'annually pay a tax on its operating property to the state and to the extent the
property is liable to taxation shall pay a local tax thereon to the county,
incorporated city, and taxing district in which its operating property is located."'







Kentucky, like most states that have a broad-based corporate income
tax,208 uses a three-factor apportionment formula2 9 to apportion or divide
the taxpayer's business income210 among the states where it does
business.2 ' Specifically, Kentucky apportions the taxpayer's income to the
state based on the percentage of its property, sales, and payroll attributable
to the state.212
Like all states that have a broad-based corporate income tax,
Kentucky uses a destination rule to attribute sales to the state in which the
goods are shipped to the customer or to the state in which they are
208 See I State Tax Guide (CCH) 10-110, at 2582-83 (1997) (listing the
apportionment formulas in each state).209 See K.R.S. § 141.120(8).
210 Section 141.120(l)(a) defines business income as "income arising from
transactions and activity in the regular course of a trade or business of the
corporation and includes income from tangible and intangible property if the
acquisition, management, or disposition of the property constitutes integral parts
of the corporation's regular trade or business operations." Id. § 144.120(1)(a). For
a discussion of the varying ways in which this language may be interpreted, see
Harriet Hanlon, Fairness, Simplification, Business Income, Open Meetings
Highlighted at MTC, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 474, 466-77 (1996) (describing four
interpretations of the business income definition in the Uniform Division of Income
for Tax Purposes Act ("UDITPA")).
211 Formula apportionment proceeds from the theory that certain factors or
elements "measure the income creating activities of the corporation in a particular
taxing jurisdiction." Arthur D. Lynn, Jr., Formula Apportionment of Corporate
Income for State Tax Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltum, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 84, 89
(1957); see also JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND
LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 410 (6th ed. 1997) [hereinafter
HELLERSTEIN &HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION]. For a more detailed
discussion of apportionment formula, see, for example, Symposium, State Taxation
ofInterstate Commerce, 27 TENN. L. REV. 239,251-57 (1960); Donald K. Barnes,
Prerequisites of a Federal Statute Regulating State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 46 VA. L. REV. 1269, 1276-82 (1960).
212 See K.R.S. § 141.120(8). Kentucky's apportionment formula gives double
weight to the sales factor. See id. Thus, if a corporation has 15% of its sales, 35%
of its property, and 40% of its payroll attributable to Kentucky, then 26% (or [15
+ 15 + 35 + 40] / 4) of its income will be apportioned to the state under Kentucky's
apportionment formula.
213 See 1 State Tax Guide (CCH) 10-110, at 2584-85 (1997) (listing each
state's position on the destination test).
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delivered to the customer.2"4 Specifically, section 141.120(8)(c)(2)(a)
provides that sales of tangible personal property are attributable to the state
if "[t]he property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the
United States government, or to the designee of the purchaser within this
state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." 215
There are three justifications for this destination rule. First, it balances
against the property and payroll factors. "To localize sales in the state from
which the goods are shipped would, in many instances, duplicate the
property and payroll factors. 216 Second, attributing sales to the destination
state recognizes the consumer state's role in the production of income.
Finally, allocating sales to the destination state is easy to administer.217
In Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Rohm and Haas Kentucky, Inc.,21 the
court addressed the question of whether products sold to a nonresident
parent that are picked up at the taxpayer's dock in Kentucky in the parent's
trucks and shipped to customers and locations outside of Kentucky are
attributable to Kentuckyunder section 141.120(8)(c).2" 9 Following the lead
of all other state courts that have interpreted similar language," the court
held that the words "within this state" modify the word "purchaser"
rather than the word "delivered," and thus the sales were attributable to the
state of their ultimate destination rather than their state of delivery,
Kentucky.221
Like most states that have a broad-based corporate income tax,2"
Kentucky has a "throwback rule" that throws back to the state of origin
214 See K.R.S. § 141.120(8)(c)(2).
215 Id. § 141.120(8)(c)(2)(a).
216 Symposium, supra note 211, at 256.
217 See id.; see also Lynn, supra note 211, at 50-51.
218 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Rohm & Haas Ky., Inc., 929 S.W.2d 741 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1996).219 See id. at 742.
"o This statutory language comes almost verbatim from the UDITPA. See id.
at 742-43.
" See id. at 743-45. Jerome and Walter Hellerstein note that the Multistate Tax
Commission regulations and the New York franchise tax regulations take a
contrary position and contend that whether dock sales to out-of-state purchasers
should be attributed to the ultimate destination or the place of delivery is a close
question. See HELLERSTEIN &HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra
note 211, at 619-21.
m See 1 State Tax Guide (CCII) 10-110, at 2584-85 (1997) (listing each
state's position on the throwback rule).
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sales to the United States government.' Section 141.120(8)(c)(2)(b)
provides that sales of tangible personal property are attributable to the state
if "[t]he property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, or
other place of storage in this state and the purchaser is the United States
government." 4 The principal purpose for this throwback rule is that the
place of delivery in the case of sales to the United States government may
be entirely casual and may not be related in any way to the business
activity conducted in the state.' Sales to the United States government are
frequently made to a single large purchasing facility and subsequently
shipped throughout the United States for consumption. It would be unfair
to have sales attributed to the state of delivery when the goods would not
necessarily be consumed in that state.226
InJim Beam Brands Co. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet,22 the Kentucky
Board of Tax Appeals held that sales of distilled spirits to overseas military
clubs did not constitute sales to the United States government within the
meaning of section 141.120(8)(c)(2)."' The sales in that case were ordered
by and delivered to specific military clubs, where the whiskey was
consumed by third parties. 9 Once shipped out of the United States, the
distilled spirits could only go to the military clubs that ordered them and
could not be diverted to any other location." The Board found that the
reason for the government throwback rule did not apply, so the throwback
rule should not apply.' The destination of the sales was not entirely
I See K.R.S. § 141.120(8)(c)(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1996).
224 Id.
I See Symposium, supra note 211, at 256; see also Lynn, supra note 211, at
50-51; UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 16 cmt, 7A
U.L.A. 354 (1985) (holding "sales to the United States government are treated
separately because they are not necessarily attributable to a market existing in the
state to which the goods are originally shipped").
2 6 See Kimmel, Corporate Income Tax, 1997 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 11-4.
2" Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 1993 Ky. Tax LEXIS
185 (Ky. Bd. Tax App., July 28, 1993).
228 See id. at *7.
229 See id. at *2.
230 See id. at *2-3.
231 See id. at *5 ("The United States throwback rule was intended in part to
prevent the normal destination rules of K.R.S. 141.120(8)(c) from being




fortuitous but instead was directly related to activity conducted at the
destination.
F. Use Taxation ofNewspaper Preprints
Section 139.310 imposes a use tax on the storage, use, or other
consumption in this state of personal property purchased for storage, use,
or other consumption in the state.132 For approximately thirty years, the
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet did not assess a use tax on advertising
preprintsP 3 purchased from out-of-state printers and shipped to Kentucky
newspaper publishers for insertion in and distribution with newspapers.
Then, in audits beginning in 1990, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet began
to assess use taxes on advertising preprints.?4
In two recent cases, 5 the Board of Tax Appeals held that the Revenue
Cabinet was prevented from assessing a use tax on advertising pre-
prints purchased outside of the state and distributed in Kentucky news-
papers because it had a long-standing practice of not imposing a use tax
on such transactions. 6 The Board's opinions, however, were not entirely
clear as to whether the policy could be changed simply by an admin-
istrative regulation promulgated by the Revenue Cabinet pursuant to the
23 See K.R.S. § 139.310 (Michie 1991).
z3"Preprints are newspaper supplements prepared for businesses by third-party
printers pursuant to contracts between the printer and the business." Dayton
Hudson Corp. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS 203, at *2 (Ky.
Bd. Tax App., May 14, 1997).
23 See id. at *6.
" See id.; Lazarus, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS
338 (Ky. Bd. Tax App., Aug. 20, 1997).
236 See Lazarus, Inc., 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS 338, at *1; Dayton Hudson Corp.,
1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS 203, at *6-7. The Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals applied
similar reasoning in Humana, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 1996 Ky. Tax
LEXIS 552 (Ky. Bd. Tax App., Mar. 11, 1996), to prohibit the Revenue Cabinet
from assessing sales and use taxes on prescription medicine and prosthetic devices
and physical aids purchased by five health care companies. In that case, the
Revenue Cabinet announced in correspondence with the companies and in a
circular letter the change in its 18-year-old policy. See id. at *2-3.
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procedures provided in section 13A 37 or only be a legislative amend-
ment. 13
237
This Board concludes that the Cabinet's position that newspaper pre-
prints are subject to use tax is a 'statement of general applicability... that
implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy' and therefore is properly
the subject ofan administrative regulation. KRS 13A.0 10(2). KRS 13A. 130
prohibits an administrative body from modifying, expanding upon, or
limiting a statute by internal policy, memorandum, or other form of action,
and declares any such action to be null, void, and unenforceable. Because
the Cabinet did not follow the mandatory KRS 13A procedures governing
the promulgation of administrative regulations but instead proceeded to
change its policy concerning the assessment of use tax on newspaper
preprints, this Board concludes that the Cabinet's policy change is null,
void, and unenforceable pursuant to KRS 13A.130.
Dayton Hudson Corp., 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS, at *6-7.
In Lazarus, Inc., the Board provided:
To the extent the Revenue Cabinet has the authority to interpret the
Kentucky sales and use tax statutes to require a use tax assessment against
newspaper supplements, that authority must be exercised in the form of a
duly promulgated and adopted administrative regulation. The Revenue
Cabinet made no effort to comply with KRS Chapter 13A in this case and
is therefore precluded from assessing use tax against newspaper preprints.
Lazarus, Inc., 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS 321, at *6 (emphasis added).
" See Dayton Hudson Corp., 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS, at *6 ("Because the
Cabinet did not previously assess a use tax against Target for newspaper preprints,
it cannot now be permitted to impose a use tax on Target without statutory
authority."). The Board noted in Lazarus, Inc.:
Because the Revenue Cabinet routinely and consistently treated preprinted
supplements as part of the newspaper and/or found them not subject to use
tax because they were not used, stored, or consumed in Kentucky, the
Revenue Cabinet is precluded from abandoning that long-standing
interpretation without specific statutory authority.
Lazarus, Inc., 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS 321, at *6.
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